Peña Nieto’s political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional ( PRI), held power in Mexico for seven decades prior to 2000, and the hands-off strategy (underwritten, generously, by bribes from the cartels) was a feature of its tenure. Some worried that he might simply leave the cartels alone, figuring, not unreasonably, that most of the narcotics that move through Mexico are consumed by Americans. He said that he would focus on public safety and on bringing down the number of homicides, but not how he would go about it. What that might entail, though, was always a little vague.
So it made sense that Peña Nieto would seek a different approach. The number one often hears is sixty thousand. If the benefits of the crackdown were few, the costs were great: no one knows precisely how many Mexicans lost their lives to the drug war during the Calderón years. Many of these groups, especially the Zetas, have branched into migrant smuggling, kidnapping, extortion, and other crimes. But, as a policy, his frontal assault was a failure: the flow of drugs across the border did not diminish to any meaningful extent, and the two dominant trafficking organizations-the Sinaloa cartel and the Zetas-both made gains in territory and influence during the Calderón years. Calderón’s strategy secured affection in Washington, where he is still regarded by American drug warriors as a staunch ally in the cause. He came into office promising to adopt a different approach than his predecessor, Felipe Calderón, who had waged war on the cartels-with encouragement and logistical support from the United States which stopped just shy of boots on the ground. Observers on both sides of the border had wondered about Peña Nieto’s resolve.
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